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Self and the Out-of-Body Experience
In an out-of-body experience (OBE), people seem to be
awake and feel that their “self,” or center of experience,
is located outside of the physical body. It is from an ele-
vated extrapersonal location that the subjects who under-
go an OBE (OBErs) experience seeing their body and
the world. The following example from Irwin (1985;
case 1) may illustrate what subjects experience during an
OBE:
I was in bed and about to fall asleep when I had the dis-
tinct impression that “I” was at the ceiling level looking
down at my body in the bed. I was very startled and
frightened; immediately [afterward] I felt that, I was
consciously back in the bed again.
An OBE is defined by the presence of three phenome-
nological characteristics: disembodiment (location of
the self outside one’s body), the impression of seeing the
world from a distant and elevated visuo-spatial perspec-
tive (extracorporeal egocentric perspective), and the
impression of seeing one’s own body (or autoscopy)
from this elevated perspective (Green 1968; Blackmore
1982; Blanke and others 2004). This is shown in Figure
1. This threefold deviance from the normal self during
OBEs has notoriously questioned (and continues to put
into question) folk psychological notions of humans
about their self and body. OBEs challenge the experi-
enced spatial unity of self and body that has been
described as the existence of a “real me” that resides in
one’s body and is the subject of experience (Neisser
1988). Psychologists (Palmer 1978; Blackmore 1982;
Irwin 1985), neurologists (Devinsky and others 1989;
Grüsser and Landis 1991; Brugger and others 1997;
Blanke and others 2004), and philosophers (Metzinger
2003) suggested that OBEs are culturally invariant neu-
ropsychological phenomena. In addition, some of these
authors suggested that OBEs are deviant self models due
to abnormal brain activation patterns whose scientific
investigation might lead to a better understanding of the
processes mediating the self under normal conditions.*
Understanding how the brain generates the abnormal
self during OBEs is particularly interesting because
OBEs not only are found in clinical populations
(Devinsky and others 1989; Grüsser and Landis 1991;
Brugger and others 1997; Blanke and others 2004) but
also appear in approximately 10% of the healthy popula-
tion (Blackmore 1982; Irwin 1985). Moreover, OBEs
have been described in the majority of the world’s cul-
tures (Sheils 1978). Yet there are to date only a few sci-
entific investigations on OBEs, probably because they
generally occur spontaneously, are of short duration, and
happen only once or twice in a lifetime (Green 1968;
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*There have been many other theories of out-of-body experiences
(OBEs). For example, some have considered the phenomenological
data during OBEs as factual evidence that OBEs reflect the actual pro-
jection of a subtle, nonphysical aspect of one’s personality in extraper-
sonal space. These authors suggested that OBEs reflect an actual sepa-
ration of the self from the body and that OBEs provide evidence for
human survival after death. See Irwin (1985, p 219–59), Blackmore
(1982, p 200–39), and Alvarado (1992) for a critical discussion of these
as well as other accounts.
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Blackmore 1982). This sparseness of scientific investi-
gations is astonishing because other body illusions such
as supernumerary phantom limbs or the transformation
of an extremity (i.e., visual illusions of body parts) have
been systematically investigated by many basic and clin-
ical neuroscientists (for review, see Ramachandran and
Hirstein 1998; Halligan 2002). Importantly, these latter
studies have led to the description of neurophysiological
and neuroanatomical mechanisms of visual illusions of
body parts and to the development of more efficient
treatments for neurological patients. This is not the case
for visual illusions of the entire body such as OBEs,
which continue to occupy a neglected position between
neuroscience and mysticism. Although several authors in
the field of psychology have experimentally investigated
OBEs (for review, see Alvarado 2000), the present
review will focus on recent neurological and neuroimag-
ing findings with respect to OBEs.
OBEs of Neurological Origin
Authors in the field of neurology have described several
patients with OBEs due to brain damage. This has result-
ed in descriptions of the etiology, associated phenome-
nology (such as autoscopic phenomena, vestibular dis-
turbances, and visual body part illusions), and anatomy
of OBEs. This is described in detail below.
Early reports were by Lippman (1953, case 1 and 2),
Hécaen and Green (1957, case 3), Daly (1958, case 5),
and Lunn (1970, case 1). More recently, Devinsky and
others (1989, case 1, 2, 3, 6, and 10) and Blanke and oth-
ers (2004, case 1, 2a, and 3) reported further cases show-
ing that the phenomenology of OBEs in neurological
and healthy subjects is very similar:
Suddenly it was as if he saw himself in the bed in front
of him. He felt as if he were at the other end of the room,
as if he were floating in space below the ceiling in the
corner facing the bed from where he could observe his
own body in the bed. . . he saw his own completely
immobile body in the bed; the eyes were closed. (Lunn
1970, case 1)
Etiology. OBEs have been observed predominantly in
patients with epilepsy and migraine. Thus, Lippman
(1953) reported two migraine patients with OBEs, and
Green (1968) reported that 11% of the OBE subjects that
participated in her survey suffered from migraine
headaches. Devinsky and others (1989) described the
largest study of neurological OBE patients and described
patients whose OBE was associated with nonlesional
epilepsy (cases 6 and 10), with epilepsy due to an arteri-
ovenous malformation (cases 2 and 3) or to posttraumat-
ic brain damage (case 1). In Blanke and others’ study
(2004), OBEs were due to a dysembryoplastic tumor
(cases 1 and 2a) and in one patient induced by focal elec-
trical stimulation (case 3).
Autoscopic Phenomena. Authors in the field of neu-
rology have classified OBEs among autoscopic phenom-
ena, which are defined as a group of illusory visual
experiences during which the subject has the impression
of seeing a second own body in extrapersonal space
(Devinsky and others 1989; Brugger and others 1997).
Next to OBEs, two other forms of autoscopic phenome-
na have been described. Devinsky and others (1989)
explicitly compared OBEs to phenomenon of autoscop-
ic hallucination, which is defined as the experience of
seeing a double of oneself in extrapersonal space with-
out leaving one’s body. Autoscopic hallucination is illus-
trated in the following example:
The patient suddenly noticed a seated figure on the left.
“It wasn’t hard to realize that it was I myself who was
sitting there. I looked younger and fresher than I do now.
My double smiled at me in a friendly way.” (Kölmel
1985, case 6)
The third autoscopic phenomenon is heautoscopy,
which is an intermediate form between autoscopic hallu-
cination and OBE. During heautoscopy, the subject also
sees his double in extrapersonal space, but it may be dif-
ficult for the subject to decide whether he is disembod-
ied or not. In fact, subjects may state that they experi-
ence seeing the world from two simultaneous or alter-
nating visuo-spatial perspectives (Brugger and others
1994; Blanke and others 2004):
[The patient] awakens from sleep and has the immediate
impression as if she were seeing herself from behind
herself. She felt as if she were “standing at the foot of
my bed and looking down at myself.” Yet . . . the patient
Fig. 1. Phenomenology of out-of-body experience (OBE).
During an OBE, the subject appears to “see” himself (bottom)
and the world from a location above his physical body (extra-
corporeal location and visuo-spatial perspective; top). The self
is localized outside one’s physical body (disembodiment). The
direction of the subject’s visuo-spatial perspective during an
OBE is indicated by an arrow. Modified from Blanke (2004).
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also has the impression to “see” from her physical [or
bodily] visuo-spatial perspective, which looked at the
wall immediately in front of her. Asked at which of these
two positions she thinks herself to be, she answered that
“I am at both positions at the same time.” She did not
have the feeling of being out of her body (Blanke and
others 2004, case 2b)
To summarize, the three forms of autoscopic phe-
nomena differ with respect to the three phenomenologi-
cal characteristics of OBEs as defined above (disembod-
iment, visuo-spatial perspective, autoscopic hallucina-
tion). Whereas there is no disembodiment in autoscopy
and always disembodiment in OBEs, subjects with heau-
toscopy generally do not report clear disembodiment but
are not able to localize their self easily. Thus, in some
cases, the self is localized at multiple positions, includ-
ing extracorporeal positions. Accordingly, the visuo-
spatial perspective is body centered in autoscopic hallu-
cination, extracorporeal in OBE, and at different extra-
corporeal positions and the body-centered position in
heautoscopy. The impression of seeing one’s own body
(autoscopy) is present in all autoscopic phenomena (for
further details, see Brugger and others 1997; Blanke and
others 2004).
Disturbed Own-Body Processing. Whereas Devinsky
and others (1989) observed the frequent association of
vestibular sensations and OBE, Grüsser and Landis
(1991) proposed that a paroxysmal vestibular dysfunc-
tion might be an important mechanism for the genera-
tion of OBEs. In Blanke and others’ (2004) study, the
importance of vestibular mechanisms in OBEs is under-
lined by their presence in all patients with OBEs and by
the fact that vestibular sensations were evoked in a
patient at the same site where higher currents induced an
OBE (Blanke and others 2002). In more detail, it has
been suggested that OBEs are associated with specific
vestibular sensations, namely, graviceptive (or otholith-
ic), and vestibular sensations (Blanke and others 2004).
Otholithic sensations are characterized by a variety of
sensations including feelings of elevation and floating,
as well as 180-degree inversions of one’s body and
visuo-spatial perspective in extrapersonal space. They
may be associated with brain damage (Smith 1960;
Brandt 2000) but also occur in healthy subjects during
space missions or the microgravity phase of parabolic
flights (Lackner 1992; Mittelstaedt and Glasauer 1993).
Interestingly, responses to microgravity may be experi-
enced either as an inversion of the subject’s body and
visuo-spatial perspective in extrapersonal space (inver-
sion illusion) or as an inversion of the entire extraper-
sonal visual space, which appears inverted by 180
degrees to the stable observer (room tilt illusion;
Lackner 1992; Mittelstaedt and Glasauer 1993). Based
on these functional similarities, Blanke and others
(2004) suggested that an otholithic dysfunction might be
an important causal factor not only for room tilt illusion
and inversion illusion but also for OBE.
In addition to vestibular disturbances, it has been
reported that OBE patients may also experience parox-
ysmal visual body-part illusions such as supernumerary
phantom limbs, and illusory limb transformations either
during the OBE or during other periods related to epilep-
sy or migraine (Hécaen and Ajuriaguerra 1952; Lunn
1970; Devinsky and others 1989; Blanke and others
2002, 2004). Blanke and others (2002) reported a patient
in whom OBEs and visual body-part illusions were
induced by electrical stimulation at the right temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ). In this patient, an OBE was
induced repetitively by electrical stimulation whenever
the patient looked straight ahead (without fixation of any
specific object; Fig. 2A). If she looked at her arms or
legs that were stretched out, she had the impression that
the inspected body part was transformed, leading to the
illusory, but very realistic, visual perception of limb
shortening (Fig. 2B, C) and illusory limb movement if
the limbs were bent at the elbow or knee (Fig. 2D, 2E).
Finally, with closed eyes, the patient did not have either
an OBE or a visual body-part illusion but perceived her
upper body as moving toward her legs (Blanke and oth-
ers 2002). These data suggest that visual illusions of
body parts and visual illusions of the entire body such as
autoscopic phenomena might depend on similar neural
structures, as argued by previous authors (Hécaen and
Ajuriaguerra 1952; Brugger and others 1997). Blanke
and others’ (2002) data also show that visual body-part
illusions and OBEs are influenced differently by the
behavioral state of the subject.
Another phenomenological link between OBE and
disturbed own-body perception is suggested by the fact
that OBE and autoscopic hallucination depend different-
ly on the patient’s position prior to the experience, sug-
gesting that proprioceptive and tactile mechanisms influ-
ence both phenomena. Thus, during an OBE, the patients
of Blanke and others (2004) were in a supine position, as
was found by Green (1968) in 75% of OBE subjects.
Interestingly, most techniques that are used to voluntari-
ly induce OBEs propose that the subjects use a supine
and relaxed position (Blackmore 1982; Irwin 1985). On
the contrary, patients with autoscopic hallucination or
heautoscopy were either sitting or standing. This con-
firms results by Denning and Berrios (1994), who
reviewed a large number of patients with autoscopic hal-
lucination and heautoscopy, suggesting that a closely
related cerebral dysfunction might lead to either
autoscopy or OBE depending on the patient’s body posi-
tion prior to or during the experience.
Anatomy. Only a few neurological OBE patients with
circumscribed brain damage have been described. In
some of Devinsky and others’ (1989) OBE patients, the
seizure focus was estimated only by electroencephalo-
gram recordings and localized to the temporal lobe or
posterior temporal region (MRI or computer tomogra-
phy was normal in most patients; Table 1). Yet, in one
patient, the lesion was found in the temporal lobe and in
another patient in the frontal and temporal lobe
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Fig. 2. Out-of-body experience (OBE) and visual body-part illusions as induced by electrical stimulation of the right temporo-parietal
junction. A, OBE: The patient felt as if “floating” approximately 2 m above the bed, close to the ceiling and to the right corner of the
room (left). She experienced seeing her body as lying in the bed but stated that she saw only the lower trunk of her body (right). B,
Illusory arm shortening: When asked to look at her outstretched arms during electrical stimulation, the patient felt as though her left
arm was shortened; the right arm was unaffected. C, Illusory leg shortening: While asked to watch her outstretched legs during elec-
trical stimulation, she reported seeing both legs “becoming shorter.” D, Illusory arm movement: If both arms of the patient were out-
stretched but bent by 90 degrees at the elbow during electrical stimulation, she felt that her left lower arm and hand were moving
toward her face. E, Illusory leg movement: If the patient’s legs were bent during electrical stimulation, she reported that both legs
appeared to be moving toward her face. The physical body appearance during electrical stimulation is shown in black lines outlining
the body. Dashed lines indicate the illusory visual perceptions of the patient with respect to her own body. There were no visual illu-
sions with respect to extrapersonal space (Blanke and others 2002).
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(Devinsky and others 1989). Lunn (1970) described an
OBE patient with posttraumatic brain damage in the
parietal lobe, and Daly (1958) described an OBE patient
with damage to the temporal lobe. More recently, Blanke
and others (2004) performed lesion analysis based on
MRI and showed involvement of the TPJ in all three
OBE patients. Moreover, Blanke and others (2002) have
shown that OBEs can be induced by electrical stimula-
tion of the TPJ, pointing to the importance of this region
in the generation of OBEs. Figure 3 summarizes the
lesion results of the OBE patients of Blanke and others
(2004). Previous studies found that OBEs related in 75%
of the patients to right hemispheric brain damage. The
localization and hemispheric lateralization of brain dam-
age in all previously reported OBE patients due to cir-
cumscribed brain damage is summarized in Table 1.
Multisensory Disintegration 
at the TPJ Leads to OBEs
To create a central representation of one’s own body
(Melzack 1990), the brain must integrate and weigh the
evidence from different sensory sources (such as visual,
tactile, proprioceptive, and vestibular information) and
quickly arrive at a decision. This involves mechanisms
for imposing coherence on information from different
sensory sources and mechanisms for diminishing inco-
herences to avoid uncertainty. Thus, the brain must cre-
ate sensory-central representations of the movement and
position of the body and its position in extrapersonal
space even if this requires the temporary inhibition of
discrepant inputs. For example, discrepant propriocep-
tive input might be discarded (and regarded as noise) if
visual, tactile, and vestibular input about the position
and movement of one’s own body concur. Yet, in some
cases, discrepant input can be very strong and persistent
and come from more than one sensory channel, leading
to two discrepant central representations of one’s own
body or body parts, as can also be induced experimen-
tally (Goodwin and others 1972; Lackner 1988). We
speculate that during an OBE, the integration of propri-
oceptive, tactile, and visual information of one’s body
fails due to discrepant central representations by the dif-
ferent sensory systems. This may lead to the experience
of seeing one’s body (autoscopy) in a position that does
not coincide with the felt position of one’s body, as pro-
posed for the affected body part in supernumerary phan-
tom limbs (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1998). As OBEs
Table 1. Clinical Findings in Previous Neurological Out-of-Body Experience (OBE) Patients with Focal Brain Damage
Patient Hemisphere Lobe Etiology
Daly (1958), case 5 Right Temporal Seizure (astrocytoma, grade III)
Lunn (1970), case 1 Right Parietal Not known (posttraumatic 
shell splinter)
Devinsky and others (1989), case 1 Right Temporo-occipital Seizure (no lesion reported)
Devinsky and others (1989), case 2 Left Frontal-temporal Seizure (no lesion reported)
Devinsky and others (1989), case 3 Right Temporal Seizure (arteriovenous 
malformation)
Devinsky and others (1989), case 6 Bilateral Temporal Seizure (no lesion reported)
Devinsky and others (1989), case 10 Bilateral Frontal-temporal Seizure (no lesion reported)
Blanke and others (2003), case 1 Right Parietal-occipital-temporal Seizure (DNET)
Blanke and others (2003), case 2a Left Temporo-parietal Seizure (DNET)
Blanke and others (2003), case 3 Right Temporo-parietal Electrical stimulation 
(normal tissue)
DNET, dysembryoplastic neuroepithelial tumor. The table summarizes etiology (right column) as well as gyral (middle column) and
hemispheric (left column) lesion location in previously reported patients with OBE of neurological origin. These studies reveal that most
OBEs are related to focal epilepsy in the right temporal and/or parietal lobe.
Fig. 3. Lesion location in out-of-body experience (OBE)
patients. The MRI-based lesion overlap analysis of the three
OBE patients from the study of Blanke and others (2004) is
shown. The MRI of all patients was transformed into Talairach
space and projected on the MRI of one patient. Each color rep-
resents a different OBE patient. In two patients, the OBE site
was located by intracranial electrodes during invasive presurgi-
cal epilepsy evaluation and in one patient by noninvasive meth-
ods for localizing the seizure-onset zone. Note the implication
in all patients of the temporo-parietal junction. See Blanke and
others (2004) for further details.
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are also characterized by disembodiment and elevated
visuo-spatial perspective, we speculate that an addition-
al otholithic vestibular dysfunction is present in OBEs.
Thus, as in the inversion illusion (Lackner 1992;
Mittelstaedt and Glasauer 1993), the visuo-spatial per-
spective and body of the OBE subject are experienced at
an extracorporeal location that is elevated and inverted
by 180 degrees with respect to extrapersonal space due
to disintegration between vestibular and extrapersonal
sensory information. To summarize, we suggest that
OBEs are related to an integration failure of propriocep-
tive, tactile, and visual information with respect to one’s
own body (disintegration in personal space) and by a
vestibular dysfunction leading to an additional disinte-
gration between personal (vestibular) space and extrap-
ersonal (visual) space. We argue that both disintegra-
tions are necessary for the occurrence of OBE and that
they are due to a paroxysmal cerebral dysfunction of the
TPJ.
The TPJ Is a Crucial Structure for Different
Aspects of Body and Self-Processing
The above model of OBEs has been based on phenome-
nological and anatomical findings in neurological
patients with OBEs. This creates a link between the com-
plex phenomenon of the OBE with multisensory disinte-
gration and deficient vestibular information processing
at the TPJ. This is not trivial, as these clinical findings
may help to demystify OBEs and facilitate a formulation
of precise research hypotheses about the sensory and
cognitive underpinnings of OBEs (as previous research
into the neural bases of complex body-part illusions has
done for phantom limbs; Ramachandran and Hirstein
1998; Halligan 2002). The neuroscientific investigation
of OBEs may also turn out to be very useful in defining
the functions and brain structures mediating such
aspects of the normal self such as bodily awareness,
embodiment, egocentric visuo-spatial perspective, and
self-consciousness.
Neuroimaging studies already support the role of the
TPJ in vestibular processing, multisensory integration,
and the perception of human bodies or body parts. First,
the core region of the human vestibular cortex (Lobel
and others 1999; Fasold and others 2002) is situated at
the TPJ including the posterior insula. Brain damage in
this area has been associated with graviceptive vestibu-
lar sensations and dysfunctions (Smith 1960; Brandt
2000). Second, several neuropsychological and neu-
roimaging studies suggest the implication of the TPJ and
cortical areas along the intraparietal sulcus in combining
tactile, proprioceptive, and visual information in a coor-
dinated reference frame (Calvert and others 2000).
Interestingly, Leube and others (2003) have shown that
the TPJ codes multisensory conflict between visual and
proprioceptive information about one’s arm position, as
proposed in the above OBE model for the entire body.
Third, the TPJ is also involved in the perception of many
different aspects of the human body, including the per-
ception of body parts (Bonda and others 1995) and the
entire body (Downing and others 2001; Astafiev and
others 2004), as well as biological motion (Grossman
and others 2000; Beauchamp and others 2002) and men-
tal imagery with respect to one’s own body (Zacks and
others 2002; Blanke and others 2003). Importantly,
Astafiev and others (2004) have shown that some of
these visual areas are modulated not only by visually
presented human bodies or body parts but also by limb
movements (without visual feedback), suggesting their
role in multisensory own-body perception.
The TPJ has also been involved in cognitive functions
that are closely linked to self-processing and OBEs: ego-
centric visuo-spatial perspective taking, agency (the
feeling of being the agent of one’s actions and thoughts),
and self-other distinction (the capacity by which one dis-
tinguishes between oneself and other conspecifics).
Thus, during OBEs, one’s visuo-spatial perspective and
one’s sense of agency are localized at the position of the
disembodied self that is hovering above the physical
body. In other words, the self is experienced to look at its
body from a third (or other) person’s visuo-spatial per-
spective and position. Furthermore, the TPJ is the classi-
cal lesion site in patients with visuo-spatial neglect
(Halligan and others 2003), a clinical condition that has
been shown to disturb the patient’s egocentric spatial
relationship with extrapersonal space and visuo-spatial
perspective taking (e.g., Farrell and Robertson 2000).
Neuroimaging studies in healthy observers have also
revealed activation of the TPJ during egocentric visuo-
spatial perspective changes in healthy subjects (Maguire
and others 1998; Ruby and Decety 2001). Moreover,
neuroimaging studies have also shown that mental activ-
ities such as agency and self-other distinction activates
the TPJ (Decety and Sommerville 2003). Although many
other cortical areas such as the prefrontal cortex, anteri-
or cingulate, postcentral gyrus, precuneus, occipito-
temporal junction, insula, and superior parietal lobule
(Grossman and others 2000; Ruby and Decety 2001;
Beauchamp and others 2002; Zacks and others 2002;
Decety and Sommerville 2003; Leube and others 2003)
have been shown to play a role in self-processing, the
reviewed neuroimaging data on body and self-
processing as well as the clinical data on OBEs suggest
that the TPJ is a key neural locus for self-processing that
is involved in multisensory body-related information
processing as well as in processing of phenomenological
and cognitive aspects of the self (Fig. 4).
Conclusion
OBEs have fascinated mankind from time immemorial
and are abundant in folklore, mythology, and spiritual
experiences of most ancient and modern societies. We
have reviewed clinical and neuroimaging evidence sug-
gesting that OBEs are culturally invariant brain phenom-
ena that can be investigated using neuroscience. These
data suggest an interaction between lower-level vestibu-
lar and multisensory processing and higher-level self-
processing such as egocentric visuo-spatial perspective
taking, agency, and self-location. It is hoped that the
22 THE NEUROSCIENTIST Out-of-Body Experience
experimental investigations of the interactions between
these sensory and cognitive systems in OBEs and relat-
ed illusions in combination with neuroimaging and
behavioral techniques will further our understanding of
the central mechanisms of corporal awareness and self-
consciousness that have long eluded scientific scrutiny.
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Appendix. Glossary
Autoscopic hallucination Experience of seeing one’s body in extracorporeal space (as a double) without 
disembodiment. The double is seen from the habitual egocentric visuo-spatial 
perspective.
Disembodiment Experience that the self is localized outside one’s physical body boundaries.
Heautoscopy Intermediate form between autoscopic hallucination and OBE; the subject 
experiences seeing his or her body and the world in an alternating (or 
simultaneous) fashion from an extracorporeal and his bodily visuo-spatial 
perspective; often, it is difficult for the subject to decide whether the self is 
localized in the double or in one’s own body.
Inversion illusion The experience of seeing the world from a location and visuo-spatial perspective 
that is inverted by 180 degrees with respect to the subject’s actual position and 
perspective. There is neither disembodiment nor autoscopy.
Out-of-body experience (OBE) Experience of seeing one’s own body and the world from a location that is out-
side one’s physical body (disembodiment). This extracorporeal location and 
visuo-spatial perspective is generally experienced as inverted by 180 degrees 
with respect to the subject’s actual position.
Room-tilt illusion The experience that the world is inverted by 180 degrees with respect to the sub-
ject, whose experienced position and visuo-spatial perspective does not 
change. There is neither disembodiment nor autoscopy.
Sense of agency The ability to recognize oneself as the agent of a behavior or thought.
Visual body-part illusions Experience of seeing parts of one’s own body (generally a limb) as modified in 
shape, position, number, or movement with respect to their habitual appearance.
Visuo-spatial perspective The point of view and the direction from which the subject experiences seeing.
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